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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Cum. 
Supp. 1994). 
ISSUES AND APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1. Did the district court err in finding that the 
Decree of Divorce in this matter was not ambiguous regarding the 
division of proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. 
Standard of Review. "Findings of fact . . . shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
"Under that standard, [appellate courts] do not set aside the 
trial court's factual findings unless they are against the clear 
weight of the evidence or [the court] otherwise reach[es] a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 v. Jackson 
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987). 
Issue 2. Did the district court err in finding that 
Defendant owed the Plaintiff child support in the amount of 
$1,982.04, representing the difference between the child support 
paid by the Defendant and the amount set forth in the child 
support guidelines. 
1 
Standard of Review,1 "Findings of fact . . . shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
f,Under that standard, [appellate courts] do not set aside the 
trial court's factual findings unless they are against the clear 
weight of the evidence or [the court] otherwise reach[es] a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 v. Jackson 
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987). 
Issue 3. Did the district court err in finding that 
Defendant's offset for one-half of all medical expenses he 
purportedly incurred on behalf of the parties' minor children was 
$1,890.83. 
Standard of Review.2 "Findings of fact . . . shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
"Under that standard, [appellate courts] do not set aside the 
trial court's factual findings unless they are against the clear 
weight of the evidence or [the court] otherwise reach[es] a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
In his brief, the Defendant likewise cites the 
inappropriate standard of review for this issue. In its 
order, the District Court made an explicit finding 
regarding Defendant's child support arrearage (R. 264) 
and therefore the appropriate standard of review would be 
the one cited above. 
In his brief, the Defendant cites the inappropriate 
standard of review for this issue. In its order, the 
District Court made an explicit finding regarding the 
medical and dental expenses for the parties minor 
children (R. 265) and therefore the appropriate standard 
of review would be the one cited above. 
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Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 v. Jackson 
Cattle Co. , 74* P.?.* n7fi. 1177 (Utah 1987), 
Issue 4. Did the district court err in finding that the 
Defendant failed to pay -alimony in the sum of $5,083.00 prior to 
February 1994, and consequently enteri i ig judgmei i t :ii i fa i ? o. i :* < >f the 
Plaintiff for said amount. 
Standard of Review.3 "Findings of fact , shal ] not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous . " utal i R C:i \ ? P. 52(a). 
"Under that standard, [appellate courts] do not set aside the 
tria ] coi u : 1 s fc ic 'tual findings unless they are against the clear 
weight of tl le evidence or [the court] otherwise react i[es] • a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made ' " 
Western Kane County Special service District No 1 v Jackson 
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1QR7K 
Issue 5. Di ci tl le district court err * awarding 
Plaint ill ill t.oiiK»y f>ps IIIIMI CDHIS :i n the amount of $4,308.00. 
Standard of Review. Absent patent error or clear abuse 
of discretion, •-.- appellate court will not disturb a trial court's 
award or aiti •• . fees. Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, 524 
(Utah 1978). 
Issue 6. The Plaintiff is entitled to « award of 
attorney fiv-es i i appeal. • " 
In his brief, the Defendant likewise cites the 
inappropriate standard of review for this issue. In its 
order, the District Court made an explicit finding 
regarding Defendant's failure to pay alimony during the 
relevant period (R. 264) and therefore the appropriate 
standard of review would be the one cited above. 
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Relevant Law. "Generally, when the trial court awards 
fees in a domestic action to the party who then substantially 
prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on 
appeal. Lynqle v. Lynqle, 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah App. 1992) (citing 
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules and regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of the instant appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a final order and judgment entered 
in the Third Judicial District Court on January 20, 1995. (R. 
272) . 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition. 
1. The parties to this action were divorced pursuant 
to a decree of divorce entered on February 8, 1991. (R. 49-54). 
2. The Decree herein explicitly provided: 
That plaintiff be and she is 
hereby awarded the use of the home and 
real property located at 2197 West 
13250 South, Riverton, Utah, until such 
time as one of the following contin-
gencies occur, to wit: (a) plaintiff 
remarries; (b) plaintiff cohabitates 
with an individual of the opposite sex; 
(c) youngest child reaches majority; 
(d) plaintiff desires to sell said 
home; (e) plaintiff no longer resides 
in said home. 
When the first of the above 
contingencies occur, said home will be 
immediately placed for sale and from 
the proceeds from said sale, the sums 
will be distributed as follows: (a) 
all costs and expenses of sale includ-
ing real estate commissions; (b) the 
balance due on the mortgage; (c) any 
costs of repairs to sell the home; (d) 
Plaintiff will be reimbursed for any 
reduction of mortgage commencing in 
February, 1991, until date of sale; and 
(e) plaintiff and defendant will 
equally divide the remaining balance. 
( : 
i . :,;jt on or about Octuijet » /, , 14'M, t lie paiiic 
sold the marital residence # t which time the Defendant concocted 
al ] sor t :,s of claims against the Plaintiff ; • educe her net 
proceeds from the sale and threatened ..-:•: * -If tl 1a I: \ u: 0 ess 
she paid such claims, the closing would :w proceed. (R. 338-
339) . 
. 4 ^hat subsequently, the Defendant I .i led a quit"'I 
title action : effort to recover the funds he claims were 
o* :otiations al the time of closing. 
(R. 78) 
5. Defendant also filed a Verified Petition for 
Modifier*I HI ul UiHivoe of Divorce, seeking to terminate alimony, 
recover certain proceeds from the sale of the marital residence, 
and recover reimbursements for medical and dental expenses 
purpoi 1 «"1<J i Y piiiii i»v I u ni | IN' 121 125) 
6 That at a temporary hearing held i n this matter, 
the Commissioner found that "the parties1 factual dispute is 
approprj ate] y r € 'So] v eel i i i fa v or of the P] a :i i it i f f "  i . 
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7. That the Plaintiff filed a Counterpetition for 
Modification of Decree of Divorce, claiming: (1) that based upon 
the income of the parties, child support should be modified for 
the remaining two minor children; (2) delinquent alimony in the 
amount of $5,083.00; child support arrearages; and reimbursement 
for amounts paid for medical and dental expenses for the minor 
children- (R. 172-176). 
8. That the above cases were ultimately con-
solidated prior to trial. 
9. That after trial, the court entered findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and order and judgment ruling, in 
pertinent part that: 
(a) Defendant's Petition to Modify was denied; 
(b) Defendant's quiet title cause of 
action was dismissed; 
(c) Based upon the parties' respec-
tive incomes, the child support amount would 
be modified to $727.00 per month; 
(d) Plaintiff was granted judgment 
against Defendant in the amount of $5,083.00 
for delinquent alimony; 
(e) Plaintiff was granted judgment 
against the Defendant in the amount of 
$1,982.04 for delinquent child support; 
(f) That the Defendant was awarded a 
set off in the amount of $1,890.83 for one-
6 
half of the children's medical and dental 
expenses; 
(g) Tha t the Plaintiff was granted 
judgment for attorney fees and costs in the 
amount of $4,308 00 
(R. 262-272). 
10. Defendant appealed from that order and judgment. 
(R. 273). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Issue 1. In the instant action, the decree of divorce 
with respect to sale of the marital residence is abundai it J; y c ] ee i • 
and explicitly provides for those expenses that will adjust the 
parti es ' I :i ] I ,i mate distribution. Under no stretch of reason could 
repayment of the parties' parents fit wit! ' " 
expenses of sale" on "any cost of repairs." 
Issue 2. Defendant argument that he prepaid child 
support in the amount of $ 7,*oo.00 is without merit. Further, 
such purported agreement between the parties contravenes public 
p support does not necessarily inure to the 
respective parties he parties' minor children. Pi nal ] y, 
the evidence was sufficient to support the court's finding that 
Dot e n< id mi ml w»is in iicie^ tl di»1 m ni|ucnt in liis child support. 
Issue 3. Defendant's evidence at trial regarding medical 
and dental payments on behalf of the parties' minor children was 
i ,H "i i' I 1"11 s (inJ i"pen: t e d cJ a :i in. 0f par ti ci i] an note , 
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the Defendant lacked documentation to verify thousands of dollars 
in medical and dental payments which he claimed he paid. 
Issue 4. There was sufficient evidence at trial to 
support the district court's finding that the Defendant was 
delinquent in his alimony payments in the amount of $5,083.00. 
Specifically, there was adequate evidence that the Defendant 
regularly paid the Plaintiff lesser sums than those set forth in 
the Decree of Divorce. 
Issue 5. An award of attorney fees is routinely based on 
the parties' respective abilities to pay the same. In the instant 
action, there was evidence that the Plaintiff was unemployed and 
that the Defendant earned $3,259.00 per month, thereby 
demonstrating the Plaintiff's inability to pay her own attorney 
fees and her attending need. The court further found that the 
Plaintiff was required to employ counsel to defend the actions 
which were brought by the Defendant and ultimately dismissed by 
the court. Finally, the court found that such fees and costs were 
necessary and reasonable based upon the time and expenditures made 
on behalf of the Plaintiff. Consequently, the attorney award 
should be affirmed. 
Issue 6. Generally, if a party in a domestic action is 
awarded attorney fees at the trial level and then subsequently 
prevails on appeal, that party is awarded reasonable attorney fees 
for such appeal. Here, in the event that the Plaintiff 
substantially prevails on appeal, this court should award attorney 
fees and costs incurred therein. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE IN THIS CASE WAS 
NOT AMBIGUOUS AS TO THE DIVISION OF THE PROCEEDS 
FROM THE MARITAL RESIDENCE. 
The Defendant irrationally argues that the Decree of 
Divorce in this case is ambiguous. Specifically, he argues that 
the Decree of Divorce does not define the term "all costs and 
expenses of sale" to either include or exclude the repayments of 
certain loans to the parties' parents. See Appellant's brief at 
p. 13. In an attempt to bolster his argument, Defendant cites 
Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah App. 1990) for the 
proposition that "[language in a written document is ambiguous if 
the words used may be understood to support two or more plausible 
meanings." Further, Defendant cites that language from the same 
case that "[a] court is justified in determining that a contract 
or order is ambiguous if the terms are either unclear or missing." 
In the case at bar, Defendant's reliance on Whitehouse is 
wholly misguided. The court's language regarding the ultimate 
distribution of the proceeds from the marital residence is 
abundantly clear and in no way lends itself to two or more 
plausible meanings. Specifically, the language that "all costs 
and expenses of sale" would be paid prior to distribution has only 
one meaning, to wit: that any expenses directly associated to the 
sale of the marital residence, i.e., real estate commissions, 
advertising, etc. would be deducted prior to any distribution. 
Even the most illogical stretch of reason would not contemplate 
9 
that such language would include repayment of loans to the 
parties' respective parents.4 
By arguing that such straightforward, simple language as 
"all costs and expenses of sale" is ambiguous so as to include the 
repayment of loans to the parties' parents, the Defendant is 
attempting to rewrite the Decree of Divorce. There is absolutely 
no evidence of such loans in the decree, nor is there any evidence 
that repayment of the same was contemplated at the time of the 
entry of the Decree. Accord-ingly, Defendant's failure to address 
this issue at the time of the Decree does not warrant some finding 
that simple language in the Decree is ambiguous so as to include 
wholly unrelated and unaddressed issues within the same.5 
Finally, Defendant argues that the Decree of Divorce 
should be construed against the Plaintiff inasmuch as Plain-tiff's 
counsel drafted such Decree, citing Home Savings and Loan v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur., 817 P.2d 341, 347-48 (Utah App. 1991). In so 
arguing, Defendant evidences a complete misunderstanding of the 
fundamental judicial tenet that the district court is presumed to 
be the drafter of the ultimate decree or order. Such is 
particularly true in this case where the decree was simply a 
4
 Inasmuch as the subject language in the decree is not 
ambiguous as claimed by the Defendant, the trial court 
was not required to employ the applicable rules of 
contract interpretation. 
5
 A further point that Defendant fails to address is that 
the parties' respective parents possibly retain some 
cause of action for recovery of the monies owed to the 
Plaintiff and Defendant. Consequently, the fact that the 
parties failed to include the repayment of the same in 
their Decree of Divorce is hardly fatal. 
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restatement of the stipulation entered into between the parties. 
Therefore, Defendant's suggestion that the clear, unambiguous 
language in the Decree should somehow be construed against the 
Plaintiff is without merit.6 
Based on the foregoing, the district court's 
determination that the relevant language in the parties' Decree 
of Divorce was not ambiguous should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL TO 
SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANT HAD CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES 
IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,982.04. 
Defendant challenges the district court's finding that he 
owes child support in the amount of $1,982.04. Defendant 
initially argues that "if the trial court erred in not finding the 
decree of divorce ambiguous, the trial court erred in finding that 
Defendant owes any sum for delinquent child support." Defendant's 
Brief at 15. However, such point is moot since the Plaintiff has 
previously established that the decree of divorce is patently 
clear. 
As part of the foregoing argument, Defendant claims that the 
parties entered into a private agreement that certain funds 
received at closing on the marital residence represented prepaid 
child support. However, the Defendant misrepresents such 
agreement. In fact, and as testified to by the Plaintiff: 
6
 Consequently, the cases cited by Defendant for this 
proposition are not controlling since those cases all 
involve private agreements presumably drafted by one 
party. 
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What I agreed to was while we were 
sitting in the closing, it wasn't closing and 
I had a home waiting to close on and Sandy 
kept refusing to close on the home and beings 
the fact I had a couple-week-old baby and we 
were in a motel, I was willing to do what I 
needed to and that's when I said I will just 
pay what I need to pay. I will go without 
child support for a year so I have a place to 
go with my children, and that's what I did. 
I was desperate at the time. I needed to do 
what I could for my kids so we could get in a 
home. 
(R. 338) 
Accordingly, there was hardly an agreement, rather, the 
Defendant coerced the Plaintiff in agreeing to waive her child 
support in consideration for proceeds to which she was already 
legally entitled. Inasmuch as this court has previously held that 
such "agreements" are unlawful since child support does not inure 
to the parents but to the child (ren), such is nevertheless 
unenforceable. 
Notwithstanding, there was sufficient evidence to support 
the following finding of the district court: 
9. That pursuant to the statute of the 
State of Utah and the Divorce Decree provision 
as to child support for the two (2) remaining 
children in custody of the Plaintiff, and based 
upon Plaintiff's Counter-Petition, the child 
support is established at Seven Hundred Twenty-
Three ($723.00) Dollars per month, and 
Plaintiff is granted judgment against Defendant 
for arrearage in child support of One Thousand 
Nine Hundred Eighty-Two and 04/100 ($1,982.04) 
Dollars, being the difference between the child 
support paid by Defendant and the child support 
schedule amount pursuant to Plaintiff's 
Exhibit. 
Finding of Fact No. 9 (R. 264). 
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As set forth in the foregoing finding, and a point 
completely ignored by Defendant in his brief, the child support 
award was modified at the time of the hearing in this matter to 
reflect the proper level of child support pursuant to the uniform 
guidelines and based upon the parties' respective incomes as 
stipulated by the parties and ultimately set forth in the parties' 
divorce decree. Specifically, the Decree provides: 
8. That defendant be and he is hereby 
ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $196.33 
per child per month, a total of $589.00 per 
month, for the support and maintenance of the 
minor children, . . . with the express 
provision that pursuant to the statute of the 
State of Utah that when each child reaches 
majority the child support shall be adjusted 
based on the Child Support Schedule. 
Decree of Divorce, Finding No. 8. 
Consequently, inasmuch as one of the parties* minor 
children had reached the age of majority, the court, pursuant to 
the Decree of Divorce, simply recalculated the support amount, 
representing the difference between that amount paid by the 
Defendant since the relevant period and the appropriate amount 
pursuant to the uniform child support guidelines. See Finding of 
Fact No. 9. Exhibit 19 and the Plaintiff's corroborating 
testimony were certainly sufficient to support the district 
court's finding regarding child support arrearage and the 
Defendant has not overcome his burden of demonstrating that such 
finding is clearly erroneous; therefore, that finding should be 
upheld. 
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POINT III 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
TO SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING 
REGARDING ALIMONY ARREARAGE. 
Defendant also challenges the district court's finding 
that he owes Plaintiff back alimony in the amount of $5,083.00, 
representing arrearages from January 1991 through August 1994. In 
addition to his testimony, which he claims controverts the 
finding, he relies on Exhibits 13 and 17 from the Office of 
Recovery Services. Notwithstanding, there was sufficient evidence 
to support the court's ultimate finding. 
Of particular significance, there was sufficient 
testimony and corroborating evidence to support the district 
court's finding. With respect to alimony arrearage, Plaintiff 
testified as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Spencer) You claim in your Counter 
Petition that Sandy is in arrears in his 
alimony payments in the amount of $5,083; is 
that correct? 
A. (By Plaintiff) I do, uh-huh. 
Q. Upon what do you base that allegation? 
A. Well, when Sandy and I first got divorced 
we--he paid me in cash. We kind of just—it 
was pretty easy going. We kind of bent for 
each other and there would be times he wouldn't 
have enough. There would be, you know, so he 
wouldn't give me enough, and there would be 
other times when I needed--when he did the 
house payments, you know, and he paid the house 
payments because I told him, I said that would 
be easier, and oftentimes he might not have 
enough for the child support or the alimony and 
so we worked out the child support, that there 
were times that Sandy would come and maybe give 
me $200 on the alimony and then he'd give me 
$175 and that's kind of how it worked on and 
14 
off and that's where I came up with that 
because there was oftentimes that it kind of 
went back and forth like that, 
Q. Do you have any records to show Sandy did 
not pay you? 
A. No, I told him that, I told him it was 
just a figure but I think it was a very 
conservative figure. 
(R. 333) (Emphasis added). 
Further, the Plaintiff testified: 
Q. (By Mr. 01 sen) You were awarded $400 
alimony? 
A. (By Plaintiff) Yes. 
Q. And you're claiming $5,093 delinquency? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was the best you could come with 
as far as your remembering, et cetra? There's 
no accounting records; is that correct? 
A. No, I just came to a conservative number. 
Q. Is that a liberal or a conservative figure? 
A. It's conservative. 
Q. You think it's greater than that, but you 
know it's at least that? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 352). 
Furthermore, Exhibit 18 provided an accounting of 
delinquent alimony. Accordingly, the foregoing testimony and 
evidence conclusively demonstrates that there was sufficient 
evidence to support the district court's finding; therefore, such 
finding was not clearly erroneous. 
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Moreover, testimony by both the Plaintiff and Defendant 
controverts the reliability of Exhibit 13 and 17 from the Utah 
State Office of Recovery Services. First, Defendant's own 
testimony demonstrates that such records did not accurately 
reflect the payment history between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant. 
Q. (By Mr. Spencer) Do you make your alimony 
payments directly to [the Plaintiff] or to the 
State of Utah? 
A. (By Defendant) Part of the time directly 
to her, part of the time to the State of Utah. 
Q. When did you start making payments to the 
State of Utah? 
A. As of January. 
Q. Of which year? 
A. January of 1994. 
Q. Now, going back to the time previous to 
January of 1994, did you make the payments to 
Regina in cash? 
A. Sometimes in cash, sometimes in checks. 
R. 297-98). 
By Defendant's own admission, therefore, he made no 
payments to the Office of Recovery Services until January of 1994, 
and the finding and judgment represented arrearages from January 
1991 to August 1994. Accordingly, the records for periods from 
January 1991 to January 1994 admitted into evidence by Defendant 
could only be confirmed by the Plaintiff who reported to Office of 
Recovery Services, who testified as follows: 
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Q. (By Mr. Spencer) Did you tell anyone at 
the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services 
that Sandy wasn't paying you alimony? 
A. (By Plaintiff) When I went into the Office 
of Recovery Services, I went in and told them I 
was going to collect on child support and they 
told me at that time that we would need to do 
alimony. To be honest with you, I did not do 
the back alimony. At that time I was very 
concerned on getting enough food for my 
children. When I went to Recovery Services, I 
had told Sandy that even if he would just 
provide food and maybe pay the utility bills, I 
wouldn't go to Recovery Services, that I needed 
that. That's what we needed. 
Q. Now, when you went to Recovery Services, 
you did go to Recovery Services this year? 
A. I did, yes. 
Q. Did you tell them at that time that there 
was an alimony arrearage due and payable? 
A. I did and I told her, though, when we went, 
everything. She said to fill out the papers 
{Exhibit 13] on the arrears and I filled out 
the arrears. I didn't go back for the other. 
Q. Did you claim arrears for 1991? 
A. I did not. I told you that. I did not 
claim arrears for anything. I did not go back 
for the back alimony. 
(R. 333-34) (emphasis added). 
Consequently, the Plaintiff's testimony candidly 
indicates that when she went to Office of Recovery Services, she 
noted on the requisite forms that the Defendant was not in arrears 
on alimony payments inasmuch as she did not want to collect on 
alimony arrearages through ORS. However, such action on the part 
of the Plaintiff does not vitiate the fact that the Defendant was 
indeed in arrearage with respect to alimony or that Plaintiff had 
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a legal right to collect the same through judicial proceedings. 
Therefore, Defendant's reliance on such is misplaced. 
POINT IV 
Defendant next challenges the district court's finding 
regarding reimbursement for medical and dental expenses for the 
parties' minor children. See finding of fact No. 14 (R. 265). 
While purporting to marshall the evidence in support of the 
finding by citing the relevant pages in the record, Defendant 
utterly fails to meet his burden of marshalling all the evidence 
and demonstrating that such is insufficient to support the 
finding. 
A simple review of the Defendant's testimony regarding 
his claim for reimbursement of the medical and dental expenses 
supports the district court's finding regarding the offset for the 
same. 
Q. (By Mr. Olsen) And you have attached to 
that document all checks that you've paid 
medical bills; is that true? 
A. (By Defendant) Yes. 
Q And there are no checks whatsoever in 
relation to what you claim to be copayments; is 
that true? 
A. That's true. 
. . . . 
Q. Okay, and the doctors you owed, you have 
got all the checks I requested by inter-
rogatories attached there, are they not? 
A. They are. 
Q. And if I tell you I've gone through those 
and the total amount of those checks is — that 
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a total amount of those checks -- I divide them 
differently. There was $1,331.19 paid to a 
Grant Weber, a collection outfit; is that 
correct? 
A. That's true. 
Q. And you got a letter from them. Therefs no 
checks on those. There's some checks you'd 
sent but they don't total $1,331.19. 
A. That's true. I knew that I would need a 
statement from them stating I did pay it in 
full. 
Q. I see. There's a bunch of checks there but 
as I recall, those are only about $500, but you 
said you paid $1,331 and got a statement from 
them. 
A. They stated in that paper that I paid 
thirteen --
Q. But anyway, if I add all those things 
together that you've got checks for, I end up 
with approximately thirty-seven, thirty-eight 
hundred dollars. I think in your document — 
let me see your document, Exhibit 5. Shows you 
have checks for $2,369.44; is that correct? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative) 
Q. And in addition to that, you have the 
$1,331.19 you paid to collection outfit? 
A. Right. 
Q. Now, it's true, is it not, that of this 
$2,369 some thing, there are some—are there 
any checks in here made payable to this 
collection outfit? 
A. To which collection--
Q. CPC, Olympus View Hospital or the 
collection company that was handling that. 
A. To Grant Wiley? 
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Q. What I'm saying is you got a statement from 
the collection agency that you paid $1,331 and 
there are some checks to that collection 
outfit. 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. That's paying the whole-- they don't total 
$1,331 and that's payment on that $1,331' is 
that correct? 
A. If a company states that I paid them a 
certain amount of money, I believe that is the 
amount I paid them. 
Q. That isn't what I'm getting at. You're 
duplicating things. If you've got checks in 
there made payable to that company, they are a 
payment on that $1331; is that true? 
A. I pulled out all of the checks to Grant 
Webber that I paid to them. They were not 
added twice. 
Q. Okay, so if we take your documents as all 
being paid, the $1,331 and the 23, we have 
total amount of, the way I calculate it, of 
thirty-six -- no an even $4,000.63. 
Q. And that's the only checks you have, is 
that true, what you've got attached. 
A. At this time I'm sure that's just a portion 
of what I paid. 
(R. 313-18). 
It is abundantly clear that based upon the foregoing 
testimony, the list of medical and dental expenses that the 
Defendant provided to the court was wholly inconsistent with the 
documentation verifying those expenses. Of particular note, the 
defendant testified that he did not have any checks for those 
amounts representing co-payments which amounted to approximately 
$6,000.00. Further, counsel for the Plaintiff elicited specific 
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testimony that the Defendant duplicated medical and dental 
expenses by setting forth the appropriate amount due the medical 
or dental provider as well as those same amounts being collected 
by collection agencies. Inasmuch as the district court had an 
opportunity to weigh the evidence provided by the Defendant in 
addition to the testimony and other evidence elicited by the 
Plaintiff in relation to the medical expenses, this court should 
not superimpose its judgment of such evidence, particularly where 
there was sufficient evidence to support the finding in question.7 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS IN THE AMOUNT OF $4,308.00. 
Finally, Defendant challenges the district court's award 
and underlying findings regarding attorney fees. "The decision to 
award costs and attorney fees in divorce and modification 
proceedings lies within the sound discretion of the trial court." 
Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 726 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Utah 
Code Ann. sec. 30-3-3 (1989 & Supp. 1994). "However, to recover 
costs and attorney fees in proceedings on a petition to modify a 
divorce decree, the requesting party must demonstrate his or her 
need for attorney fees, the ability of the other spouse to pay, 
and the reasonableness of the fees. Ld. (citing Morgan v. Morgan, 
This court should likewise note that the Defendant does 
not necessarily challenge the reimbursement claim for 
medical and dental expenses by the Plaintiff set forth in 
Exhibit 23 and Exhibit 24. 
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854 P.2d 559, 568 (Utah App.)/ cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 
1993). 
In the case at bar, the district court made explicit 
findings regarding each of the foregoing factors, and the 
Defendant has failed to marshall or attack those findings; this 
court may presume the validity of the same. Speci-fically, with 
respect to the Plaintiff's need and the Defendant's ability to 
pay, the court found that "Plaintiff is presently unemployed and 
has assessed income to Plaintiff of minimum wage, or Seven Hundred 
Fifty-Four ($754.00) Dollars per month. That Defendant is 
employed by Salt Lake County and has gross income of Three 
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Nine ($3,259.00) Dollars. See Finding 
of Fact No. 10 (R. 264). Moreover, as to the reasonableness of 
the requested fee, the court found: 
13. That Plaintiff has been required to 
employ counsel in defending the actions by 
Defendant, and Plaintiff's counsel's fees were 
necessary and were reasonable based upon the 
time and expenditures made on behalf of the 
Plaintiff and it is fair and reasonable that 
Plaintiff be awarded judgment against Defendant 
for reasonable attorney fees in the sum of Four 
Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Eight ($4,198.00) 
Dollars, together with costs in the amount of 
One Hundred Ten ($110.00) Dollars, for a 
judgment of total attorney fees and costs of 
Four Thousand Three Hundred Eight ($4,308.00) 
Dollars. 
Finding of Fact No. 13 (R. 265). 
Inasmuch as the district court considered each of the 
necessary factors in awarding attorney fees in the present 
modification case, the court did not abuse its discretion in doing 
so. 
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POINT VI 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
"Generally, when a trial court awards fees in a divorce 
[or modification] action to a party who then prevails on appeal, 
that party will also be entitled to fees on appeal." Larson, 888 
P.2d at 727 (citing Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App. 
1991). Here, in the event that the Plaintiff prevails or 
substantially prevails on appeal, this court should remand this 
action to the district court for an award of reasonable attorney 
fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this court should: (1) determine 
that the decree of divorce in this matter is sufficiently clear 
and unambiguous; (2) uphold the findings of the district court as 
to child support arrearages, alimony arrearages, and medical and 
dental expense reimbursement; (3) determine that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the Plaintiff 
attorney fees and costs in the amount of $4,308.00; and (4) 
determine that the Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable 
attorney fees incurred in defending the present appeal. 
DATED this f day of A^AQkN-x^" / 1995. 
NOLAN J. OLSEN ~ 7 ^ 
Attorney for Plain^ff/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the \ day of /WcuA-^,7 / 
1995, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE, postage prepaid thereon, to: 
MARY C. CORPORON, Esq. 
TERRY R. SPENCER, Esq. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
COPY OF DECREE OF DIVORCE 
DATED FEBRUARY 8, 1991 
Third Jucoiat D'&n>ct 
FEB 0 8 1991 
NOLAN J. OLSEN 
Utah State Bar No. 2464 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 255-7176 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ai^asas 
REGINA LYNN NELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANDY KEVIN NELL, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 904904147 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
The above-entitled matter having come on to be heard 
on the 22nd day of January, 1991, before Commissioner Michael 
Evans, plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney, Nolan 
J. Olsen, and defendant appearing in person and by his attorney, 
Martin J. Pezely, and plaintiff and defendant having stipulated 
in open court, and plaintiff and defendant having each approved 
the stipulation in open court, and the court having approved -he 
stipulation, and plaintiff having been sworn and testified 
concerning the allegations of her Complaint, and the court having 
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and upon motion of Nolan J. Olsen, attorney for 
plaintiff, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. That the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing 
between plaintiff, REGINA LYNN NELL, and defendant, SANDY KEVIN 
NELL, be and the same are hereby dissolved. 
1. That plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the 
care, custody and control of the three children born as issue of 
said marriage, to-wit: Mandy Lynn Nell, born February 26, 1976; 
Travis Sandy Nell, born November 25, 1977; and Trenton J. Nell, 
born April 12, 1980, subject to the right of reasonable 
visitations by the defendant which shall include but not be 
restricted to the following: 
a. alternating weekends from Friday at 6:00 
p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m., with the express provision that due 
to the fact defendant's work schedule requires him to work 
weekends on occasion, the parties will work out the weekends such 
that defendant can have two weekends each month; 
b. alternating holidays; 
c. Father's Day and defendant's birthday; 
d. a portion of children's birthdays; 
e. Christmas Eve from 12:00 noon until 5:00 
p.m, 
vacation; 
f. Christmas Day from 1:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.; 
g. a minimum of two weeks each summer for 
h. such other times as the parties may agree. 
Plaintiff shall have the children on Mother's Day 
and plaintiff's birthday. 
2. That plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the 
use of the home and real property located at 2195 West 13250 
South, Riverton, Utah, until such time as one of the following 
contingencies occur, to-wit: 
a. plaintiff remarries; 
b. plaintiff cohabitates with an individual of 
the opposite sex; 
c. youngest child reaches majority; 
d. plaintiff desires to sell said home; 
e. plaintiff no longer resides in said home. 
When the first of the above contingencies occur, 
said home will be immediately placed for sale and from the 
proceeds from said sale, the sums will be distributed as follows: 
a. all costs and expenses of sale including 
real estate commissions; 
b. the balance due on the mortgage; 
c. any costs of repairs to sell said home; 
d. plaintiff will be reimbursed for any 
reduction of mortgage commencing in February, 1991, until date of 
sale; 
e. plaintiff and defendant will equally divide 
the remaining balance. 
3. That plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as 
her sole and separate property the furniture, furnishings and 
fixtures located in the home, with the exception of certain 
personal property as agreed to by the parties which will be 
awarded to defendant; 1983 Cadillac; 1982 Voltswagon Rabbit; one-
half of savings bonds; one-half of 401k at defendant's place of 
employment as of December 31, 1990; one-half of defendant's 
retirement at Utah State Retirement Fund as of December 31, 1990; 
and her personal belongings. 
4. That defendant be and he is hereby awarded as 
his sole and separate property the 1975 Ford pickup; motorcycle; 
trail bike; 4 wheel ATV; 3 wheel ATV; one-half of savings bonds; 
one-half of 401k at defendant's place of employment as of 
December 31, 1990; one-half of defendant's retirement at Utah 
State Retirement Fund as of December 31, 1990; and his personal 
belongings. 
5. That a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall 
be signed by the court awarding to plaintiff one-half interest in 
defendant's 401k plan and retirement at Salt Lake County and Utah 
State Retirement Fund. 
6. That plaintiff be and she is hereby ordered to 
assume and pay the mortgage on the home due American Savings; 
Jordan School Credit Union; LDS Social Services; South Jordan 
City; and any other debts she has incurred since the filing of 
the Complaint. 
7. That defendant be and he is hereby ordered to 
assume and pay the Salt Lake County Credit Union; Internal 
Revenue Services; Larry Peterson on medical bills; miscellaneous 
medical bills incurred during the marriage; and any other debts 
he had incurred since the filing of the Complaint, and hold 
plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
8 . That defendant be and he is hereby ordered to 
pay to plaintiff rhe sum of $196.33 per child per month, a total 
of $589.00 per rronth, for the support and maintenance of the 
minor children, a copy of said child support obligation worksheet 
<k * /\ * * 
is attached hereto marked Exhibit "A", with the express provision 
that pursuant to the statute of the State of Utah that when each 
child reaches majority the child support shall be adjusted based 
on the Child Support Schedule. Defendant shall subtract from the 
child support as set forth above the costs of medical insurance 
on the minor children. Defendant shall pay said child support 
until each child reaches majority or completes high school 
whichever occurs last. Defendant shall pay one-half of said 
child support on or before the 5th day of each month and one-half 
on or before the 20th day of each month. 
9. That defendant be and he is hereby ordered to 
pay to plaintiff the sum of $400.00 per month as alimony until 
defendant remarries, cohabitates, or dies, or there is a 
substantial change of circumstances by reason of plaintiff's 
graduating from college and obtaining higher paying employment. 
10. That plaintiff and defendant be and they are 
hereby ordered to maintain medical insurance on the minor 
children as long as a policy is available at their place of 
employment, and plaintiff and defendant should each be ordered to 
pay one-half of medical and dental expenses not covered by 
insurance. 
11. That plaintiff and defendant be and they are 
hereby ordered to maintain the children as beneficiaries on their 
present group life insurance policies. 
12. That plaintiff and defendant be and they are 
hereby ordered to assume and discharge their individual attorney 
fees and courts costs. 
*! J ft <• £ * 
DATED this \ day of ^ AAJWHAA. 
BY THE COURT tf 1991, 
SAWDRAH*B3fcK 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ,-ffiffi- day of\ 
1991, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing tTECREE 
DIVORCE, to: Martin J. Pezely, Attorney for Defendant, 23 Maple 
Street, Midvale, Utah 84047, postage prepaid thereon. 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
COPY OF FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DATED JANUARY 20, 1995 
NOLAN J. OLSEN 
Utah State Bar No. 2464 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 255-7176 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REGINA LYNN NELL, 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
SANDY KEVIN NELL, i Civil No. 90 4 90 4147 DA 
Defendant. : Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial on the 
21st day of December, 1994, before the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick; Plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney Nolan 
J. Olsen; and Defendant appearing in person and by his attorney, 
Terry R. Spencer; and Plaintiff and Defendant having submitted 
evidence to the Court; and Plaintiff and Defendant and other 
witnesses having testified; and the Court having consolidated the 
civil case of Sandy Kevin Nell vs. Regina Lynn Nell, Civil No. 
940902163; and the Court having taken said matter under 
advisement; and the Court having made its ruling on the 22nd day 
of December, 1994, and good cause appearing therefor; and the 
Court having been fully advised in the premises now makes the 
following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Defendant's civil action as against Plaintiff 
pursuant to Civil No. 940902163, was consolidated for trial with 
Defendant's Petition for Modification and Plaintiff's Counter-
Petition for Modification, in the above matter. 
2. That Defendant alleged in his Petition to Modify that 
there had been a change of circumstances, as to distribution of 
monies from the sale of the home and as to the payment of 
Plaintiff and Defendant's parents. The Court, however, determined 
that there was no substantial change of circumstances, as to said 
matter, 
3. That Defendant alleges in his civil action and 
Petition to Modify, that Paragraph 2 of the Divorce Decree was 
ambiguous. The Court determined, however, that Paragraph 2 is not 
ambiguous and that the provisions set forth by Paragraph 2 is the 
determining factor in relation to the division of the money 
received from the sale of the home. 
4. That the Lis Pendens filed as Entry No. 5783080 in 
Book 6909, Page 1157/1158 on the 1st day of April, 1994 in che 
office of the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, be and the same 
is hereby dismissed, terminated and discharged. 
5. That Merrill Title Company be and it is hereby 
ordered to deliver the Seven Thousand Two Hundred ($7,200.00) 
Dollars held in escrow pursuant to the sale of the property 
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to wit: "Lot 1302 
Mountain View Estates #13", to the Plaintiff, Regina Lynn Nell. 
6. That: Plaintiff remarried on September 5, 1994, and 
based upon said marriage, alimony terminated on said date. 
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7. That pursuant to the Counter-Claim on the civil 
action Number 940902163, the accounting of monies pursuant to 
Paragraph 2 of the Complaint provides that Defendant owes to 
Plaintiff the sum of One Thousand Six Hundred Thirty and 67/100 
($1,630.67) Dollars. 
8. That Defendant has failed to pay alimony in the sum 
of Five Thousand Eighty-Three ($5,083.00) Dollars prior to 
February, 1994, and Plaintiff should be granted judgment against 
Defendant for delinquent alimony in the sum of Five Thousand 
Eighty-Three ($5,083.00) Dollars. 
9. That pursuant co statute of the State of Utah and the 
Divorce Decree provision as to child support for the two (2) 
remaining children in the custody of Plaintiff, and based upon 
Plaintiff's Counter-Petition, the child support is established at 
Seven Hundred Twenty-Three ($723.00) Dollars per month, and 
Plaintiff is granted judgment against Defendant for arrearage in 
child support of One Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Two and 04/100 
($1,982.04) Dollars, being the difference between the child 
support paid by Defendant and the child support schedule amount 
pursuant to Plaintiff's Exhibit. 
10. That Plaintiff is presently unemployed and has 
assessed income to Plaintiff of minimum wage, or Seven Hundred 
Fifty-Four ($754.00) Dollars per month. That Defendant is 
employed by Salt Lake County and has gross income of Three 
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Nine ($3,259.00) Dollars. 
11. That it is fair and reasonable that Defendant be 
ordered to pay to Plaintiff child support for the two (2) minor 
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children, the sum of Seven Hundred Twenty-Seven ($727.00) Dollars 
per month, commencing in January, 1995. 
12. That it is hereby ordered that Universal Income 
Withholding be effected pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
62A-11-502. Further, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
62A-13-502(4) (b) , an order assessing a Seven ($7.00) Dollar per 
month check processing fee shall be withheld and paid to the 
Office of Recovery Services for the purposes of income 
withholding. 
It is further ordered that the Uniform Income Withholding 
be and is hereby ordered withheld for child care expense pursuant 
to this Decree of Divorce. 
13. That Plaintiff has been required to employ counsel 
in defending the actions by Defendant, and Plaintiff's counsel's 
fees were necessary and were reasonable based upon the time and 
expenditures made on behalf of Plaintiff and it is fair and 
reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded judgment against Defendant 
for reasonable attorneys' fees in the sum of Four Thousand One 
Hundred Ninety-Eight ($4,198.00) Dollars, together with costs in 
the amount of One Hundred Ten ($110.00) Dollars, for a judgment of 
total attorneys' fees and costs of Four Thousand Three Hundred 
Eight ($4,308.00) Dollars. 
14. That Defendant had paid medical and dental bills for 
the children of the parties, and pursuant to the Divorce Decree 
Plaintiff was to reimburse Defendant for one-half (M) of said 
medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance, and based 
upon the expenditures shown by the evidence presented by Plaintiff 
and Defendant, Defendant should have an offset from above set 
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forth judgment in the sum of One Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety and 
83/100 ($1,890.83) Dollars for the one-half (Ji) medical and dental 
expenses, which are attributable to the Plaintiff. 
15. That based'upon the judgments as set forth above and 
the offset for medical expenses, Plaintiff should be awarded 
judgment against Defendant in the sum of Eleven Thousand One 
Hundred Twelve and 88/100 ($11,112.88) Dollars. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That Defendant's Petition to Modify be and the same 
is hereby denied, as to distribution of funds from the sale of the 
home and payment of Plaintiff and Defendant's parents. 
2. That Plaintiff's Complaint in the civil action Civil 
No. 940902163, be and the same is hereby dismissed, as no cause of 
action. 
3. That Plaintiff be and she is hereby granted judgment 
against Defendant based upon her Counter-claim in Civil No. 
940902163, in the sum of One Thousand Six Hundred Thirty and 
67/100 ($1,630.67) Dollars. 
4. That Plaintiff's alimony terminated September 5, 
1994. 
5. That Plaintiff should be granted judgment against 
Defendant for the sum of Five Thousand Eighty-Three ($5,083.00) 
Dollars delinquent alimony. 
6. That Plaintiff should be granted judgment against 
Defendant for the sum of One Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Two and 
04/100 ($1,982.04) Dollars delinquent child support. 
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7. That Plaintiff should be awarded judgment against 
Defendant for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of court in the 
sum of Four Thousand Three Hundred Eight ($4,308.00) Dollars, for 
the use and benefit of Plaintiff's counsel. 
8. That the Divorce Decree in the above-entitled matter 
should be modified as follows: 
a. That Defendant should be ordered to pay to 
Plaintiff child support for the two (2) minor children 
in the sum of Seven Hundred Twenty-Seven ($727.00) 
Dollars per month, commencing January, 1995 and 
continuing until the children reach the age of majority 
or complete high school in their normal graduating 
class, whichever occurs last. 
b. That when the oldest child reaches majority, 
that Defendant should be ordered to pay child support to 
Plaintiff for the one (1) child in her custody, based 
upon the income of Plaintiff and Defendant at the date 
the said oldest child reaches majority or completes high 
school in his normal graduating class, whichever occurs 
last. 
9. That mandatory withholding should be ordered. 
DATED this W a a y of January, 1995. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of January, 
1995, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Terry R. Spencer 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
COPY OF ORDER MODIFYING 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
DATED JANUARY 20, 1995 
MU ZO '9S5 
NOLAN J. OLSEN ' 
Utah State Bar No. 2464 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 255-7176 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REGINA LYNN NELL, : n\(j> 33Q.> 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *° 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANDY KEVIN NELL, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 90 490 4147 DA 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial on the 
21st day of December, 1994, before the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick; Plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney Nolan 
J. Olsen; and Defendant appearing in person and by his attorney, 
Terry R. Spencer; and Plaintiff and Defendant having submitted 
evidence to the Court; and Plaintiff and Defendant and other 
witnesses having testified; and the Court having consolidated the 
civil case of Sandy Kevin Nell vs. Regina Lynn Nell, Civil No. 
940902163; and the Court having taken said matter under 
advisement; and the Court having made its ruling on the 22nd day 
of December, 1994, and good cause appearing therefor; and the 
court having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusicns of Law, and upon motion of Nolan J. Olsen, attorney 
for Plaintiff, and good cause appearing therefor, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. That Defendant's Petition to Modify be and the same 
is hereby denied, as to distribution of funds from the sale of the 
home and payment of Plaintiff and Defendant's parents. 
2. That Plaintiff's Complaint in the civil action Civil 
No. 940902163, be and the same is hereby dismissed, as no cause of 
action. 
3. That Plaintiff be and she is hereby granted judgment 
against Defendant based upon her Counter-claim in Civil No. 
940902163, in the sum of One Thousand Six Hundred Thirty and 
67/100 ($1,630.67) Dollars. 
4. That the Lis Pendens filed as Entry No. 5783080 in 
Book 6909, Page 1157/1158 on the 1st day of April, 1994 in the 
office of the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, be and the same 
is hereby dismissed, terminated and discharged. 
5. That Merrill Title Company be and it is hereby 
ordered to deliver the Seven Thousand Two Hundred ($7,200.00) 
Dollars held in escrow pursuant to the sale of the property 
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to wit: "Lot 1302 
Mountain View Estates #13", to the Plaintiff, Regina Lynn Nell. 
6. That the Divorce Decree in the above-entitled matter 
be and it is hereby modified as follows: 
a. That Plaintiff's alimony be and is hereby 
terminated as of September 5, 1994. 
b. That Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to 
pay to Plaintiff child support for the two (2) minor 
children in the sum of Seven Hundred Twenty-Seven 
($727.00) Dollars per month, commencing January, 1995 
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and continuing until the children reach the age of 
majority or complete high school in their normal 
graduating class, whichever occurs last. 
c. That when the oldest child reaches majority, 
that Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay child 
support to Plaintiff for the one (1) child in her 
custody, based upon the income of Plaintiff and 
Defendant at the date the said oldest child reaches 
majority or completes high school in his normal 
graduating class, whichever occurs last. 
7. That Plaintiff be and she is hereby granted judgment 
against Defendant for the sum of Five Thousand Eighty-Three 
($5,083.00) Dollars delinquent alimony. 
8. That Plaintiff be and she is hereby granted judgment 
against Defendant for the sum of One Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-
Two and 04/100 ($1,982.04) Dollars delinquent child support. 
9. That it is hereby ordered that Universal Income 
Withholding be effected pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
62A-11-502. Further, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
62A-11-502(4) (b) , an order assessing a $7.00 per month check 
processing fee shall be withheld and paid to the Office of 
Recovery Services for the purposes of income withholding. 
It is further ordered that the Uniform Income Withholding 
be and is hereby ordered withheld for child care expense pursuant 
to this Decree of Divorce. 
10. That Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded judgment 
against Defendant for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of 
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court in the sum of Four Thousand Three Hundred Eight ($4,308.00) 
Dollars, for the use and benefit of Plaintiff's counsel. 
11. That Defendant be and he is hereby awarded a set off 
of One Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety and 83/100 ($1,890.83) 
Dollars for the one-half (M) medical and dental expenses, which 
are attributable to the Plaintiff. 
12. That based upon the judgments as set forth above and 
the offset for medical expenses, Plaintiff be and she is hereby 
awarded judgment against Defendant in the sum of Eleven Thousand 
One Hundred Twelve and 88/100 ($11,112.88) Dollars. 
DATED this yjOJ^day of January, 1995. 
BY THE ICOURT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / / 
1995, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Terry R. Spencer 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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